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Abstract—The challenge in applying the known information
theoretical measures for biometric authentication systems is
that on one hand these measures are defined in a specific
context and on the other hand there are several constructions
known for the protection of biometric information. The goal
of this work is to organize and conceptualize the existing
knowledge in the area of security of biometrics and build a
bridge between the formal model of cryptography and the
practical view of the signal processing area. It is the scope
of this paper to build and present the framework where
results from both cryptography and signal processing can be
integrated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric security systems that verify a persons identity
by scanning fingerprints, irises or faces are becoming more
and more common. Authentication with biometrics requires
comparing a registered or enrolled biometric sample (biome-
tric template or identifer) against a newly captured biometric
sample (for example, a fingerprint captured during a login).
Biometric authentication is not perfect and the output of
a biometric authentication system can be subject to errors
due to imperfections of the classification algorithm, poor
quality of biometric samples, or an adversary who has tam-
pered with the biometric authentication systems. Although
biometric authentication is intended primarily to enhance
security, storing biometric information in a database intro-
duces new security and privacy risks. Anonymous biometric
authentication techniques allow the authentication of users
without requiring the server to store a biometric reference
information [4]. They were proposed to mitigate the risk of
storing biometric information. The main challenge in build-
ing anonymous biometric authentication is the unpredictable
nature of the biometric data. Security and privacy measures
for anonymous biometric authentication estimate the chances
of success of an adversary who is not honest and behaves
maliciously. Security and privacy for anonymous biometric
authentication is studied from two different, complementary
and sometimes conflicting angles. On the one hand, cryp-
tography offers elegant theoretical models, which transform
noisy, non-uniform strings into reproducible, uniform strings
suitable for cryptographic purposes. These models have to
offer precise formalisms and concrete adversarial models
while making minimal assumptions. The problem is that due
to the minimal assumptions, results are mostly of theoretical
interest. The signal processing area deals mostly with the
practical aspects of the recognition process, like algorithms
for detecting the reliable features in a biometric sample,
pattern recognition techniques, etc. The emphasis is put
on the building blocks and their performance trade-offs
with models that are less formally defined compared to
cryptography. Although security and privacy are recognized
as being important, their analysis is mostly superficial often
missing the specification for the adversarial model.
It is the scope of this paper to build and present the
framework where results from both cryptography and signal
processing can be integrated. A common starting point
to present results is beneficial for both. Practical results
from the signal processing area would benefit by the for-
malisms that cryptography has to offer, while taking a closer
look at the more realistic data models and authentication
scenarios could lead to new, exciting results. The chal-
lenges in building the common frame to present results
are twofold. Firstly, there are several methods, which can
achieve anonymous biometric authentication and that are
conceptually different. For example, the fuzzy extractor [1]
constructs during enrollment a reproducible, uniform string
from the biometric sample collected during enrollment that
is reconstructed during authentication only if the biometric
sample presented during authentication is close in terms of
a predefined distance to the enrollment biometric sample.
Cancelable biometrics applies a transformation function
on the biometric sample collected during enrollment and
during authentication [3]. Authentication is achieved if the
transformed biometric samples are close with respect to a
pre-defined distance measure. Secondly, security and privacy
measures are defined for a specific theoretical construction
(fuzzy extractor, fuzzy sketch, etc.) and for a given model of
the input data (biometric data can be represented as discrete
variable or as continuous variables).
Our contributions are threefold: firstly, we propose a
model for authentication that is general to all the known
models of anonymous biometric authentication. Secondly we
propose a generic enrollment function that is composed from
four generic building blocks that cover most of the transfor-
mations that can be applied to transform the biometric data
into suitable input to cryptographic purposes. Thirdly, we
present the known measures for security and privacy in the
context and constraints in which they were defined.
II. BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION AND ANONYMOUS
BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION
A. Biometric Authentication
A biometric authentication system is a computational
process that involves two parties: a user (Alice) and a
biometric server (Bob). Bob is assumed to have a database
D = {b1, b2, ..bM} of M biometric signals. Authentication
with biometrics is a two step process. The first step is
enrollment. During enrollment Bob learns the identity of
Alice and stores a reference of her identity, bA in database
D. The second step is verification. During verification Alice
provides b′A to Bob who verifies whether the biometric
measurement of the claimed identity (bA) matches b′A. It
is an established fact that two biometric measurements
collected from the same person are almost never exactly
the same. Therefore Bob uses a distance function d to asses
whether bA and b′A are within a pre-defined range. Biometric
measurements collected from the same person are, in most
cases, closer (d(bA, b′A) ≤ t) than biometric measurements
collected from different persons (d(b, b′A) > t).
Definition 1 (BAS): A (D, d, t)-biometric authentication
system (BAS) is a computational protocol between two
parties, Bob who has access to biometric database D, and
Alice with a probe bA such that at the end of the protocol,
Bob can compute v = 1 if (∃)b∗ ∈ D such that d(bA, b∗) ≤ t
and v = 0 otherwise.
We note that a biometric authentication system can run
in two modes. The first is verification when Alice claims an
identity bi ∈ D and Bob verifies the claim by computing the
distance between the claimed identity bi and the provided
sample bA. The second is identification where Alice makes
no identity claim and Bob matches bA against all biometric
identities in the database D. In this paper by authentication
we refer to the verification scenario.
B. Anonymous Biometric Authentication
Biometric information is classified as highly sensitive
because it might reveal sensitive information, such as ethnic
origin, gender or medical condition. Some of these attributes
are disregarded when the biometric measurements are pro-
cessed and biometric templates are generated. Nonetheless,
these kinds of results indicate a potential exposure of sen-
sitive information in current biometric systems and give
Bob additional, unnecessary information about Alice. Also
biometric data is relatively unique and stable over time, both
qualities being essential for authentication purposes. How-
ever, biometric data cannot be reissued. If Bob’s database is
compromised and the information in the database is revealed,
Alice cannot use her biometrics for the purpose of authenti-
cation. Another privacy threat spurred by the widespread use
of biometric applications is the ability to track users across
applications by comparing biometric references facilitated
by the uniqueness and persistence of biometric characteris-
tics. To model this scenario we assume Bob, the biometric
server has access to set of databases D = {D1,D2, · · · DN}.
Each biometric database corresponds to a service or an
application. To access service i, Alice has to prove to Bob
that her identity is stored in database Di. As opposed to
BAS authentication, Alice will not present the probe b∗, but
an authentication secret g∗ derived from bA. Similarly, Bob
will not store biometric samples but the secret g∗ derived
from them. We emphasis that Bob never receives b∗ but only
the secret g∗.
Definition 2 (ABAS): A (D, T, d, t) anonymous biometric
authentication system (ABAS) is a computational protocol
between two parties, Bob the biometric server who owns a
set of databases D = {D1,D2, · · · DN} and Alice with an
authentication secret g derived from the probe bA with the
following properties at the end of the protocol:
1) Bob can compute T (g, g∗) = 1 if (∃)g∗ ∈ Di derived
from a probe b∗ such that d(bA, b∗) ≤ t;
2) Except for the authentication result v = T (g, g∗)
for g∗ ∈ Di Bob has negligible knowledge about
the probes bA, b∗ (to try and reconstruct them) and
insufficient knowledge about the comparison results
between d(bA, b∗) to conduct, e.g. a hill-climbing
attack;
3) Except for the authentication result v = T (g, g∗) of
the (g∗ ∈ Di) Bob cannot obtain any verification result
v′ = T (g, g′) of the (g′ ∈ Dj) for (∀)j 6= i;
In the following section we look at the known constructions
for the realization of an ABAS.
III. GENERIC CONSTRUCTION FOR ABAS SYSTEMS
The enrollment and authentication in an ABAS involves a
non-invertible transformation of the biometric signal during
enrollment that allows the reconstruction of a secret value
when a similar biometric is presented during authentication.
There are several known generic constructions (summarized
in table I) that Bob can use to construct an ABAS. These
construction vary on the accepted input (discrete vs con-
tinuous signals), the reconstructed secret and the security
guarantees that can be offered.
When using a fuzzy sketch, during enrollment Bob applies
function F on the biometric x and the output is F (x) = p,
which is public. Bob stores p. During authentication function
G is applied on the biometric x′ presented by Alice and
the stored p. If x′ is close enough, function G will output
G(x′, p) = x. A fuzzy sketch reconstructs the biometric sig-
nal recorded during enrollment. An alternative to the fuzzy
sketch is a fuzzy extractor. A fuzzy extractor transforms a
noisy, non-uniform biometric measurement into a uniform
Table I
OVERVIEW OF KNOWN CONSTRUCTIONS FOR BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE PROTECTION.
Definition Enrollment Authentication Test Public Information
Fuzzy Sketch [1] F (x) = p G(x′, p) = x∗ T (x, x∗) ∈ {0, 1} p, h(x), F,G, T
Fuzzy Extractor [1] F (x, r) = (p, s) G(x′, p, r) = s∗ T (s, s∗) ∈ {0, 1} p, r, h(s), h(r)F,G, T
Fuzzy Embeder [2] F (x, k) = p G(x′, p) = k∗ T (k, k∗) ∈ {0, 1} p, h(k), F,G, T
Cancelable Biometrics [3] F (x, k) = p G(x′, k) = p∗ T (p, p∗) ∈ {0, 1} p, k, F,G, T
and reproducible sequence. During enrollment, Bob applies
function F on the biometric x and on the explicit random
parameter r that extracts a public sketch p and a secret s. The
goal of the authentication stage is to reconstruct the secret s
by applying function G on the biometric sample presented
by Alice and the public sketch p. A fuzzy embedder binds
the biometric to a binary string k, generated externally.
When using a fuzzy embedder Bob applies function F to the
biometric input x and key k and stores the result F (x, k) = p
in the database. The goal of the authentication stage is to
reconstruct the binary string k using function G on input
x′ provided by Alice and public sketch p provided by Bob.
When using cancelable biometrics Bob applies function F
on the biometric measurement x of Alice. The function F
has to be probabilistic therefore Bob adds an explicit param-
eter r to function F . The transformed biometric F (x, r) = p
is stored in the database. During authentication the same
transformation is applied to the biometric measurement
provided by Alice x′ and Bob compares whether the two
transforms are close enough. Generically, we can model the
enrollment as a function F that Bob applies on inputs: x-
the biometric sample, r-the explicit random value and k-the
external source of randomness. The result of the enrollment
stage is F (x, r, k) = (p, s) is a public sketch p and a secret
value s. The parameters of the authentication function vary
according to the specifics of each particular construction,
but generically it is applied on: x′- the noisy version of
biometric, p-the public sketch and r-the random value when
F is a probabilistic function. The result of the authentication
stage is G(x′, p, r) = g∗ where g∗ ∈ {h(x), h(s), h(k)} the
authentication secret can be either x the biometric measure-
ment collected during enrollment, s-the noise free, uniform
biometric sequence or k the external source of randomness.
Part of the authentication process is also the binary test
function T that compares the result of the enrollment and
authentication process. The test function T will not work
on the values x, s and k directly, but on transformed values
h(x), h(s) and h(k), where h is a collision-free one-way
function that does not reveal any data about its input. In prac-
tice, such functions are implemented by cryptographic hash
functions, which we assume leak no information on their
input. Generically we write T (h(x), h(s), h(k), g∗) = 1 if
Bob can authenticate Alice and T (h(x), h(s), h(k), g∗) = 0
if Bob fails to authenticate Alice. Definition 3 formalizes
the construction of an ABAS as described above.
Definition 3 (Construction ABAS): An (D, F,G, T, d)-
ABAS is a construction of an (D, T, d)-ABAS between
Bob, the biometric server and Alice who wants to be
authenticated, which proceeds as:
1) During enrollment Alice computes F (x, r, k) = (p, s)
and gives Bob the value p and g ∈ {h(x), h(s), h(k)}.
2) During authentication Alice computes the
authentication secret G(x′, r, p) = g∗ where
g∗ ∈ {h(x), h(s), h(k)} and Bob verifies the
authentication secret by using the test function
T (h(x), h(s), h(k), g∗), which returns 1 when
d(x, x′) ≤ t.
In the following sections we establish the terminology with
respect to the meaning of security and privacy in the context
of anonymous biometric authenticators.
IV. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES FOR
BIOMETRIC KEY AUTHENTICATORS
Before the various security and privacy threats can be
described in more detail, one first needs to define what
security and privacy mean in the context of biometrics. To
formalize the concepts of privacy and security, Breebart, et.
al [4] introduce the concept of Trusted Biometric System
(TBS). The TBS takes as inputs a biometric characteris-
tic and an identity claim, and as outcome produces the
verification decision. Hence the TBS represents the ideal
biometric system, where for example all the components
function as expected and the various components inside the
TBS are not accessible to fraudulent attackers. The security
of a TBS can be understood as the difficulty to obtain a
false accept. Similarly, privacy can be understood as the
level of protection against an attacker that tries to obtain
any other information than a verification decision from the
stored verification information and a claimed identity.
In the context of biometric authentication systems Ye, et.
al [5] classify adversarial behaviors broadly in two classes:
semi-honest and malicious. A semi-honest adversary follows
the protocol faithfully but attempts to find out additional
information about the other parties involved in the protocol.
A malicious adversary can change private inputs and even
attempt to disrupt the protocol by premature termination.
Security in the context of ABAS can be understood as the
difficultly for Charlie, a malicious adversary, to convince
Bob that he is Alice. Charlie knows the public parameters,
the functions used during enrollment and authentication
and can change private inputs in the functions used during
authentication. Charlie cannot control the enrollment process
and cannot change the information stored by Bob in the
database. Privacy in the context of ABAS is defined in the
presence of a semi-honest Bob, who can use the information
stored in the database to learn more information about
Alice. An example in this sense is the race, gender, medical
condition of Alice but also the types and frequency of
application and services that Alice uses.
V. SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST A
COMPUTATIONALLY UNBOUNDED ADVERSARY
We note that our purpose is to illustrate the known
measures for security and privacy in the context and
constraints in which they are defined. The key element in
this sense is the enrollment function F that determines
the properties of the authentication secret, the amount of
tolerated noise and the amount of information that is leaked
to an adversary. In the following section we propose an
enrollment function that is constructed using four generic
building blocks (quantization, error correction, extractor and
randomization), which takes as input a noisy, non-unifom,
continuously represented biometric measurement and
transforms it into a reproducible, uniform binary feature
vector. The building blocks form a logical decomposition,
a typical enrollment function must not use all blocks in
figure 1, some can use only quantization, others error
correction and/or randomization, etc. Moreover the order of
the blocks can be different compared to Figure 1 or some
blocks can overlap. We argue, however that each of the four
blocks solves a well defined problem and in the following
we take a closer look at the purpose and requirements for
each of the four blocks.
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Figure 1. Building blocks for a generic enrollment function F . The shape
of the building block is a code for its function: square blocks can do error
correction, rhombus blocks do distribution shaping and the round block
does randomization.
A. Building blocks for the enrollment function
The enrollment function described in figure 1 shows
the building blocks for a generic enrollment function
F (x, r, k) = (p, s) that transforms a continuous variable
X into a discrete random variable Y by quantization,
transforms the noisy variable Y into a reproducible
sequence Z, extracts all randomness from Z into the
uniform variable S and diversifies the reproducible,
uniform sequence S with the help of an external source
of randomness K. We argue that the model described
in figure 1 covers most of the work done in the area
of construction of cryptographic keys from noisy data.
Theoretical work in the area usually covers the error
correction block and randomness extraction [1], [6] whereas
others, look at more practical aspects like quantization [7],
[8] or randomization [10].
QUANTIZATION. The quantization block is used to transform
continuously distributed data X with probability density
function fX(x) into discretely distributed data Y with dis-
crete probability density fY (y). This block can shape the
probability density function distribution fX(x) into fY (y)
and changes the continually distributed data into discretely
distributed data. Gersho, [11] describes quantization as a
mechanism whereby information is thrown away, keeping
only as much as is really needed to reconstruct the orig-
inal value to within a desired accuracy as measured by
some fidelity criterion. Formally, a quantizer is a function
Q : X → Y that maps x ∈ X into a reconstruction point
y ∈ Y by Q(x) = miny∈Y d(x, y) where d is the distance
measure defined on X .
A “known trick” to improve the performance of a
quantizer is to store user specific information, which is
computed during enrollment and used during authentication.
Common types of user specific information are: the error
offset for a specific user eX = Q(X ) − X [12], [2] or
information regarding the distinguishability of a feature
component [13]. User-specific quantization functions are
superior in terms of the false accept vs. false reject trade-
off compared to user-independent quantization function.
However the former will leak user information (P1 in
figure 1) while the latter will leak no information.
ERROR CORRECTION. The error correction block adds re-
dundant information to the input variable Y to increase
the probability that its values are correctly reproduced. The
input variable Y = (Y1, Y2, · · ·Yn) is represented as a n-
dimensional vector and its elements Yi are called feature
vectors. There are two types of noise that can occur in Y .
The first is additive noise where elements of Yi are perturbed
by noise and the second is replacement noise where some
features of Y can disappear and new features can appear
between two consecutive measurements. To perform error
Table II
INFORMATION THEORETICAL MEASURES OF SECURITY AND PRIVACY.
Notation Description
Charlie has no information about Alice
H(Y );H(S);H(K) Shannon entropy. Measures the probability Charlie guesses Y = y in an average case scenario (the
probability of y is close to the probability of the expected value of the distribution of Y ). The same
measure can be used to evaluate the strength of S and K.
Hδ∞(Y ) Smooth min-entropy. Measures the probability that Charlie guesses Y = y in an almost worst case
scenario (the probability of g is δ-smaller compared to the element with the maximum probability in
fY (y)). It cannot be applied to S and K because both are assumed to be uniformly distributed, therefore
there is need to eliminate δ-entropy.
H∞(Y );H∞(S);H∞(K) Min-entropy. Measures the chance that Charlie guesses the value of Y = y in a worst case scenario (y
is the element with the highest probability in the probability distribution associated to Y ). Min-entropy
represents the probability that Charlie guesses the value of the key from 1 trial. It can be used also for
variables S and K.
G(Y );G(S);G(K) Guessing entropy. Represents the average number of guesses needed to guess the authentication secret
when Charlie is using the optimal strategy. Can be applied to any discrete variable, so it makes sense to
use it on Y, S,K.
SD(Z,U) Statistical distance. It measures how close the distribution of Z is to the uniform distribution U . This
is a measure of distinguishability; any system in which U is replaced by Z will behave exactly the same
as the original with probability 1-SD(Z,U).
Charlie knows the public sketch P = (P1, P2, P3)
H(Y |P2),H(K|P3) Conditional entropy.Measure the chances of Charlie predicting Y (average case) when P2 is known to
Charlie. It can also be used to measure the chance of Charlie predicting K when he knows P3.
H˜∞(Y |P2),H˜∞(K|P3) Average min-entropy. Measures, for random P2 and P3 the average chances of Charlie predicting Y
or K (worst case), when P2 or P3 respectively is known to him.
Measures the amount of information Bob knows
I(X;P1) Mutual Information. Measures the amount of common information between P1 and X .
H∞(Y )− H˜∞(Y |P2),H∞(K)− H˜∞(K|P3) Entropy loss. It is used as a performance measure and measures the amount of entropy that is lost by
making the sketch public. Can be used on both Y and K variables.
HQ∞(Y )−HQ∞(Y |P2) Relative entropy loss.The measure represents the number of additional bits that could have been extracted
if an optimal quantization function is used. It makes sense to use it when entropy is evaluated for a variable
obtained after a quantization function is used.
correction a public sketch (also called helper data) is
computed for Y . If the helper data is made public, which
is the case in most scenarios, it reveals information about
the variable Y . Error correction schemes which correct
additive noise where proposed by several authors among
which [12] while error correction schemes for replacement
noise can be found in [10], [14]. The performance of an error
correction scheme is measured in terms of errors correction
and information leakage.
EXTRACTORS. This block is used to transform any probabil-
ity density function fY (y) into a uniform probability func-
tion fZ(z), which is desirable for a cryptographic algorithm.
A randomness extractor is used to “purify” the randomness
coming from an imperfect source of randomness, it can
efficiently convert a distribution that contains some entropy
(but is also biased and far from uniform) Y into an almost
uniform random variable Z. The performance of a random-
ness extractor is measured in terms of the statistical distance
between the distribution of the output variable Z and the
distribution of a uniform random variable R, in figure 1.
In the process of randomness extraction an external source
of randomness must be present. Reducing the randomness in
the external source and producing outputs, which are as close
as possible to a uniform distribution is the main research
topic in this area [15], [16].
RANDOMIZATION. When biometrics is used as a noisy
source, the purpose of randomization is the protection of
privacy. For example, from one fingerprint only one repro-
ducible, uniform string can be extracted. The randomization
ensures that from one fingerprint multiple random sequences
can be produced. Randomization can be done by xor-ring
the uniform, reproducible binary biometric (S in figure 1)
with another binary sequence (K in figure 1), as in the
code-offset construction introduced by Dodis, et. al [1], by
asking a random, binary, question to each feature and store
the answer [17], adding chaff points [10] or by applying
a transformation function as in the case of cancelable
biometric schemes [3].
B. Information theoretic measures of security and privacy
The challenge in describing the known information the-
oretical measures is that on one hand not all enrollment
function use all blocks and on the other hand not every
measure can be used in any context, for instance, min-
entropy cannot be used on continuously distributed random
variable. We found about a dozen measures, see table II.
for both security and privacy, each capturing a different
aspect and measure of protection against a semi-honest
and malicious adversary. In the context of security we are
interested in the probability that Charlie predicts a random
value, in this case the authentication secret. For Charlie we
model two scenarios, in the first scenario Charlie has no
information about Alice while in the second scenario Charlie
knows the public sketch of Alice. Information theoretical
measures for Charlie consider the probability of the value
he has to guess within the probability distribution of the
variable to be predicted. In the context of privacy common
measures in the literature define the amount of information
that Bob can learn about the input data.
When using table I as a guide for which measures to
use in the context of a given enrollment function, we first
recommend to look at three aspects (1) the goal of the
adversary (2) the properties of the variable to be guessed,
in other words the type of authentication secret that is used
(biometric, binary biometric sequence or an external random
sequence see table I) and (3) the building blocks of the
enrollment function, which gives an indication of the trade-
offs that have to made and choose the ones that are relevant.
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